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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
:3TATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
Vs. 
Hl '"~i'.RD NEWMEYER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 17512 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with the crimes of rape and forcible 
sc,Clorry, in violation of Sections 76-5-402 and 76-5-403, Utah Code 
i'-.n,-.otated, 1953, as amended, in that on or about August 29, 1980, 
at Utah County, Utah, the Defendant had sexual intercourse with 
a female not his wife, MARIE ELLEN MARTIN, without her consent, a 
felony of the second degree, and that the Defendant performed a 
sexual act upon the same female, by the use of his sexual organ 
in the mouth of said female without her consent. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried in the Fourth Judicial District Court of 
Utah County, the Honorable Maurice Harding, Judge, on the 20th of 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
November, 1980, before a jury, which jury brought back a 
finding the Defendanl guilty as charged on both counts. 
Defendant was sentenced by the Court on December 12, 1980, to 
serve 1-15 years and 5 to life in the Utah State Prison. Notke 
o: Appeal was timely filed by Appellant. 
RELI~~_SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant respecti~ely requests that the Court vacate the 
Judgment 0 ntered in the District rourt an<'l remand the case witr. 
a~ o~der granting the Defendant a new ~rial in this matter. 
BRIEF STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the 29th of August, 1980, the Defendant, HOWARD NEWMEYER, 
made contact with MARIE ELLEN MARTIN, the Complaining witness 
in this case. She was a clerk at the 7-11 Store in Lindon, 
Utah. MRS. MARTIN, although married, agreed to accompany the 
Defendant to his house after she got off work sometime after 
11:00 PM that night, (R., 30). Their association that night led 
to an act of sexual intercourse between them. Defendant asserts 
that the inte::course occurred as a result of mutual consent, al-
though MRS. M1'.RTIN says she was raped. MRS. MARTIN returned to 
her home later that night and failed to report or discuss this 
incident with her husband. She again failed to discuss the prior 
-2--
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r 
,,,rJht's occurrances with her husband the next morning when he 
JP ft for work, (R. ,49). That afternoon ritter discussions with 
friends they reported the incident to the police, and the Def-
Pnc1ant was arrested, (R., 78). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY QUESTIONED THE DEFENDANT'S 
TESTIMONY SO AS TO GIVE THE JURY THE CLEAR IMPRESSION 
THAT THE JUDGE DISBELIEVED THE DEFENDANT. 
Article I, Section 11 of the Constitution of the State of 
Utah provides in part: " ... No persons shall be barred from 
orosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State 
The Court has made the following statement in reference to the 
above cited section of the Constitution: 
In addition to the important right to have access 
to the Courts, it is equally important that the 
Court be fair and impartial, committed to the 
purpose of seeking truth and doing justice, with-
out bias or prejudice, fear or favor. In pursuing 
that objective, it is not to be questioned that, 
particularly in a jury trial, a Judge should main-
tain an attitude of neutrallty and should not, 
either by his comments or demeanor indicate his op-
inions either as to the credibility of the evidence 
or on the disputed issues of fact. Consistent with 
the foregoing, the Judge should and normally does ex-
ersise restraint in examining witnesses, so that he 
does not unduly intrude into the trial or encroach 
-3-
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upon the functions of coun:cel, (Bmphasis .l'Hided). 
State vs. Mellen, 'i31 P.2d 46, 4R. 
Althouqh a Judge is not required to sit silently in 
maintaining the appropriate attitude of neutrality, he should 
also refrain from openly espousing the position of the Plaintiff 
or Defendant in the case before him. The Court's exclusive 
prerogative is to decide the law in each case, and not to argue 
factual matters on behalf of either Party before him. Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, Section 77-17-10, as amended, provides: 
(1) In a jury trial, questions of law are to be 
determined by the Court, questions of fact by the 
jury. 
(2) The jury may find a general verdict which in-
cludes questions of law as well as fact but they 
are bound to follow the law as stated by the Court. 
Judges are pr:ohibi ted from deciding issues of fact in a jur;· 
er ial, and it is inappropriate for a trial judge to give a jury 
e~en subtle indications as to whether evidence which has been 
presented is believable or not. In State vs. Rosenbaum 449 P.2c 
999 (Utah, 1969), this Court reversed the Defendant's convictio~ 
of burglary holding that the trial court had committed 
prejudicial error by giving the jury an instruction disparaging 
the Defendant's alibi defense. The Court said: 
In this State the trial Judge is not permitted to 
comment on evidence and he, therefore, may not 
indicate to a jury that evidence is either weak or 
convincing. It is the sole and exclusive province 
-4-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of the jury to determine the facts in a criminal 
case, and this it must do regardless of the rel-
ative strength or weakness of the evidence in the 
case. 449 P. 2d at 1000. 
It is clear that a trial Judge may not in any way indicate 
to the members of a jury whether or not he personally believes or 
discredits whatever evidence is being presented. Certainly 
Judges have their personal opinions and beliefs, as does any 
person, but Judges have a special duty not to communicate their 
po,rsonal beliefs to the members of the jury in any possible way. 
If a trial Judge does project the attitude of belief or disbelief 
a~ring a witnesses testimony, the jury may be improperly 
influenced by the Judge's opinion. If a jury is influenced by a 
Co1Jrt's expression or communication of belief or disbelief, the 
Court has invaded the province of the jury to evaluate the 
evidence. 
The record discloses that the Prosecution based part 
of its proof of "force" on behalf of the Defendant by introducing 
State's exhibit i4, a knife. (R. ,105) The prosecution focused 
its questioning of the Defendant on this knife ( R.,141, 142) 
inferring that the Complaining witness would never have seen the 
kdfe had the Defendant not used it to threaten her. After the 
prosecution and defense had both questioned the Defendant at 
length, the Court began cross-examining the Defendant. (R.,154, 
155) The trial court began following a line of questioning which 
-5-
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the Prosecutor had already completed, regarding the location Cf 
State's exhibit !14, the knife. At the very least the Court's 
questions were repetitive on a subject matter which had clear! 
already been covered by the Prosecution. However the Judge's 
demeanor became extremely skeptical arid disbelieving, culminat:· 
in his question: "How do you account for the fact she told the 
Officers tf-ie next day wrat kind of a knif": it was?" (R. ,155) Tf· 
attitude of the trial Junge, the edge on his voice, and his 
skeptical expression all communicated a clear disblief and 
dissatisfation with the Defendant's answer. It became so 
obviously prejudicial that the prosecution hurriedly interruptec 
the Court and again resumed his recross-examination on another 
topic. But by this time members of the jury, the Prosecutor an; 
Defense counsel, and spectators in the court room were looki~· 
one another and at the trial judge quizzically, wondering what 
had prompted such an open display of disbelief on his part. 
The actions by the trial court gave those persons present, 
including members of the jury, every indication as to what the 
Judge thought of the testimony of the Defendant: he totally 
disbelieved it. This invades the province of the jury, whose 
-6-
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prerogative it is to evaluate the evidence presented. Such 
behavior on the part of the trial Judge was in effect a comment 
on his behalf to the jury that they need not believe the 
Defendant's testimony any more than he did. This is clearly 
impermissitle and certainly prejudicial to the Defendant. 
In State vs. St. Clair 301 P. 2d 752 (Utah, 1956) the Supreme 
Court affirmed the trial court's conviction of the Defendant for 
111uriJer. At trial evidence was presented by the Prosecution that 
the Defendant had cut a backdoor screen with his pocketknife to 
yain entry to the house where he allegedly killed a woman. In 
response to this testimony the trial Judge made a comment which 
questioned the Prosecution's interpretation of the markings or 
lack of markings on the screen door and on the pocketknife. How-
ever the Supreme Court was unable to see how this judicial 
comment of the evidence, although improper, was prejudicial to 
t~e Defendant, since the Court's statement questioned the 
Prosecution's evidence. Therefore the conviction was upheld. 
Ho~ever in the case at bar the comments of the trial judge were 
directed to the testimony of the Defendant himself, and the 
incredulous demeanor adopted by the trial Judge was directed 
specifically at the Defendant's explanation. 
-7-
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In State vs_._Str:ob_r!_l 456 P.2d 170 (Utah, 1969) this c 0 urt 
reversed the Defendant's conviction on burglary and larceny anr. 
remanded for a new trial. After voir dire there was some 
quC?stion about the voluntariness of a confession, and the trial 
court announced in front of the jury that this was a question f· 
the jury. The Supreme Court held this constituted error, becau,. 
the question was in fact one for the Judge. The judgment was 
reversed and remanded for a new trial because the court had i~ 
properly instructed the jury to perform a function which was 
within the province of the trial Judge. The Judge had 
effectivly abrogatec his responsibility to desioe the question, 
In the case at bar the guilty verdicts should be reversed be-
cause the trial Judge overstepped the bounds of his 
res;:ionsibilities, and invaded the province of the jury. By iIT.-
properly indicating to the jury his strong disbelief of the De'.· 
end ant's testimony, the trial court was improperly influencing 
the jury in it's duties as a finder of fact. Defense counsel 
moved for a mistrial on the basis of the Court's prejudicial 
behavior, which motion was denied. (R., 157, 158) 
Even though the trial court's actions were improper, they 
constitute reversible error only when they are found to be pre-
judicial to the rights of the Defendant in obtaining a fair 
-8-
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trial. State vs. Archuletta 501 P. 2d 263 (Utah, 1972). Def-
cc,,,'ant respectfully submits that the actions of the trail court 
:~~uw amounted to an abuse of discretion which substantially pre-
ju'ic0d the Defendant's right to a fair trial, and his conviction 
i~ that court should therefore be reversed, and the Defendant 
nted a new trial. 
POINT II 
STATEMENTS BY THE PROSECUTOR TO THE JURY DURING 
CLOS ING ARGUMENT THAT THE JURY HAD A DUTY REGARDING 
THE VICTIM IN RETURNING THEIR VERDICT TAINTED OR 
REMOVED THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE OF DEFENDANT. 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 76-1-501, provides in 
(1) A Defendant in a criminal proceeding is 
presumed to be innocent until each element of 
the offense charged against him is proved be-
yond a reasonable doubt. In the absence of such 
proof, the Defendant shall be acquited. 
Since it is the Defendant on trial in a criminal proceeding 
it is his rights which are effected by the outcome of the trial. 
T~e State has the burden to present evidence and the burden of 
~rcof showing Defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. A 
criminal proceeding is not a balancing of interests between the 
victim of a crime and the alleged perpetrator thereof. The State 
-9-
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acts on behalf of all of its ci+-izens in pres<"r'Jing their rig'': 
including the rights of the citizen charged with the crime. 
very essence of such r iqhts is the presumption of innocence, ar 
this presumption extends to every person until their guilt is 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. State vs. Mannion 57 P. 542 
(Utah, 1899) State vs. Topham 123 P. 888 (Utah, 1912). Any 
statement by the Prosecution which in any way alters the State': 
burden as regards the Defendant's presumption of innocence is 
improper. At the trial ~elow the Prosecution made a state-
ment during closing argument to the effect that the jury had a 
duty in comming to its verdict to consider the rights of the 
victim of this crime. This statement was not transcribed and 
therefore does not appear in the record of the trial. Howevec 
counsel for the defense objected to the same and moved for a 
mistrial, which motion ths court below denied. (R., 157, 158) 0 '• 
court below made no attempt to rehabilitate the jury or to 
discount the comments made by the Prosecutor. 
Certainly both the prosecution and the defense are entitle! 
to characterize the case in the light most favorable to 
themselves. But this does not include statements to the jury 
whl.ch could possibly shift the burden of proof from the State to 
the Defendant. In State vs. Valdez 513 P.2d 422 (Utah, 1973) t\; 
-10-
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sur,reme Court affirmed the conviction of the Defendant for 
inurcler, in spite of some allegedly prejudicial remarks made by 
the prosecutor. The Court stated: 
Counsel for both sides have considerable latitude 
in their arguments to the jury; they have the 
to discuss fully from their standpoints the 
evidence and the inferences and deductions 
arising therefrom. The test whether the remarks 
made by counsel are so objectionable as to 
merit a reversal in a criminal case is, did the 
remarks call to the attention of the jurors 
matters which they would not be justified in con-
sidering in determining their verdict, and were 
they, under the circumstances of the particular 
case orobably influenced by those remarks. The 
determination of whether the improper remarks 
have influenced a verdict is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court on motion for a new 
trial. If there is no abuse of this discretion 
and substantial justice appears to have been done, 
the appellate court will not reverse the judgment. 
(Emphasis added) 513 P.2d 426. 
Defendant here contends that the statements of the 
Prosecutor during argument at trial below called the attention of 
the jury to matters which they were not justified in considering 
when coming to their verdict. And because of the delicate 
nature of a case such as this, where the entire issue is that of 
consent, the slightest tipping of the balance could have 
influenced the jury either way. Because of the conviction of the 
Defendant on both counts, it can be assummed that the jury was 
probably influenced by those remarks of the Prosecutor to the 
-11-
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sympathy of the jury. This combined with improper cross-
ex~min1ng of the Defendant by the trial court below, amounts 
to ?n abuse of discreti0n by the trial court. Where the facts 
are as tenuous as the ones etablished at trial below, and the 
trial judge and Prosecutor have both made improper statements, 
Defendant's conviction below resulted from prejudicial 
circumstances which denied him substantial justice. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE UPON WHICH THE JURY RENDERED 
A GUILTY VERDICT WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
THE CONVICTIONS FOR RAPE AND FORCIBLE SODOMY. 
A. The evidence presented at trial below was 
so inherently improbable under the circum-
stances that reasonable persons, in the ab-
sence of the errors committed, could not have 
convicted the Defendant. 
In State vs. Horne 364 P.2d 109 (Utah, 1961) this court 
reversed the Defendant's conviction of forcible rape. In that 
case as in the case at bar, the issue of intercourse was not 
disputed by either side, rather it was a question of consent. 
Th~ court found it significant that the Complaining witness 
made no outcry over a three hour period when the Defendant was 
in her bedroom, despite the fact that she lived in a trailer 
-12-
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house within twenty or thirty feet of other trailers. Evidence 
also failed to established that the Complaining witness made any 
attempt to escape, although she apparently had opportunity to do 
so. Her clothing showed only limited evidence of a possible 
struggle, and instead of reporting the incident immediately to 
the Police, she waited all the next day and into the evening 
before calling for assistance. Noting that the old rule of 
"resistance to the upmost" was obsolete and no longer applicable, 
the court stated: 
However, in determining the sufficiency of the 
evidence, there must be considered the ease of 
assertion of the forcible accomplishment of the 
sexual act, with the impossibility of defense 
except by direct denial, or of the proneness of 
the woman, when she finds the fact of her discrace 
discovered or likely of discovery to minimize her 
fault by asserting force or violence, which had 
led courts to hold to a very strict rule of proof 
in such (rape) cases ...• We have carefully evaluated 
the testimony of the prosecutrix and conclude it is 
so inherently improbable as to be unworthy of be-
1 ief and that, upon objective analysis, it appears 
that reasonable minds could not believe beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the Defendant was guilty. The 
jury's verdict cannot stand. Reversed. (Emphasis 
Added) 364 P.2d at 112, 113. 
The parallels between the facts established at the trial 
below and the ones in the Horne case, supra, are noteworthy. 
-13-
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'The evidence presented hy the Prosecution and Defense in this 
case shows that the Prosecutrix and the Defendant were acquain: 
so,:ially, and that the Prosecutrix voluntarily accompanied tr.• 
Defendant to his house (R., 30). This amicable beginning led tr. 
these two individuals spending a period of time together whict 
resu~ted in intercourse. No evidence was presented that ~e 
Complainif'c; witness atteIT.pted to escape, or attempted to alert 
c.ny neighbors to her supp•Jsedly precarious situation. Evi8er. 2, 
of any force vccS minimal. and showed little, if any, marks of 
any struggle on the Complaining witness's part. (R., 115, 124; 
Upon leaving the residence of the Defendant she did not 
immediately report the incident to the police, instead she wen: 
home. There she was confronted by an irrate husband who had be• 
concerned over her delay. Yet again she failed to disclose ~ 
him anything about "the incident", (R., 49). The next mornings~ 
did not call the police and she did not tell her husband. 
On)y later the next day, after confiding in friends, did she be· 
come impressed with the necessity of calling the police, (R.,8> 
Such a delay in reporting "the incident" to the Police 
gives rise to the obvious inference of an effort on the part of 
U·e Complaining witness to "minimize her fault hy assertinq for:• 
of ·. i_ole nee". Sucr1 .1 rt...,ry is unworthy cf belief upon objectiui 
-14-
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~nal;sis, and reasonable minds could not believe beyond a reason-
alle rloubt that the Defendant herein was guilty of the crimes 
charged. 
The Horne court quoted from the case of State vs. Williams 
180 P. 2d SSl (Utah, 1947). There the Supreme Court reversed a 
conviction of the Defendant at trial for rape. The Court stated: 
Under such state of the record may the verdict 
of guilty be permitted to stand? We think not. 
Nevertheless we cannot escape the responsibility 
of passing judgment upon whether under the evidence 
a jury could, in reason, conclude that the Def-
endant's guilt was proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt. This is not to say that merely by reason 
of the fact that the circumstances surrounding an 
alleged assault of this nature created a reasonable 
doubt in the mind of this court that the offense was 
in fact committed, we will set aside a verdict. The 
total picture presented by the record here considered 
must be kept in mind in evaluating the result here 
reached. 180 P.2d at SSS. 
The same situation is applicable in the case at bar. Under 
>:c.e facts as presented at trial below reasonable minds simply 
could not conclude that Defendant was guilty beyond all 
reasonable doubt. This Court has held that if there is nothing 
so inherently incredible about a rape victim's story that 
reasonable minds would reject it, a conviction may rest upon the 
Complaining Witness's testimony alone. State v. Studham 572 
P. 2d 700 (Utah 1977). But under the facts established at trial 
-15-
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in the case below, the Complaining witness's explaination for 
behavior is inherently incredible. There is simply no 
explaination for her failure to report the incident until lat, 
the next day. If she was truely as out.raged as she should ha,
1
, 
been had she in fact been forced to engage in the intercourse, 
she simply would not have waited that length of time before 
reporting the incident. Since there is no other conclusive 
evidence besides the Comolaining witness's testimony th2t she. 
not consent to the act of intercourse, the question is 
essentially reduced to whether or not her story is believable, 
not. Defendant asserts that the same rule as regards 
circumstantial evidence should apply to this case, that is, a 
cor,viction may rest upon such evidence only when the facts are 
i ncompa ti hle with the innocence of the accused by anv reasonabl' 
hypothesis, and are incapable of explaination upon any other 
reasonable explaination other than the Defendant's guilt. 
State vs. Lamb 131 P.2d 805 (Utah, 1942) Since the facts of tt,:' 
case obviously establish another equally reasonable explainatic· 
besides the Defendant's guilt, that is the consent of the 
Complaining witness, the Defendant should not be found guilty 
upon such evidence alone. 
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B. The errors committed at trial below sub 
stant1ally preJudiced the Defendant's right 
to a fair trial. 
Rule 30 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Utah Code 
Annolated, 1953, Section 77-35-30, as amended, provides in part: 
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance 
which does not effect the substantial rights of 
a party shall be disregarded. 
Defendant submits that the errors committed at the trial 
below had a substantial and prejudicial effect on the Defendant's 
right to a fair trial. 
In State vs. Howard 544 P.2d 466 (Utah, 1975) this court 
··3cated the Defendant's conviction of rape and remanded the case 
for a new tr ia 1. The evidence established that the association 
bet~een the parties came about in a friendly and peaceful manner 
ana the al1egation by the Complaining witness of a transition 
into violence raised a genuine and critical issue as to her 
consent. Because the trial court excluded proffered evidence 
about the Complaining witness's reputation and moral character 
the Supreme Court found there may have been a different result 
haa such evidence been allowed at trial. The Court stated the 
test for determining whether or not an error was prejudicial as 
follows: 
-17-
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... (l \ f 1_1,)nn l.~)nkino a·- th~ w,1<".>'~,~ '-'\l-l(lenc~ i_t 
.ipr)~ars bf~\onc1 a r€-as0;;ablc rL,Jubt thZJ.t tlli:>f<? 
is :-'O suti~;tc,n·ial li!<elihood ~11:-.t thP vet<1iC't 
\·.'cul·:'l ha?e LPPn cli ff<>rert in tt··e absenc,o of the 
C'rror, it shoulcl be disreoarrle:•d. Bu' ·~he> re'JPtSE 
~~-i ti or:i_i :o a 1 so true: that i ftlore_i_s_il __ 
reasonable likelihood that in the ·absence -c;T-the 
error, there would have been a flifferent. result, 
the error should be reqarded as pre1ud1c1al. 
(Emphasis added) 544 P.2d 468, 469. 
r 
Had the trial court in the case at bar maintained a prope:. 
neutral attitude towards the Defendant and had the Prosecutor 
u:frained from commenting upon the duty the jury had to the 
victim in the alleged crime, there is a substantial likeliho~ 
that the jury would have reached a different result, and 
acquitted Defendant on both counts. Therefore Defendant is 
2ntltlPd to a new trial for these alleged crimes. 
In State vs. Eaton 569 P. 2d 114 (Utah, 1977) this couit 
rev~rsed the Defendant's conviction that trial for the 
d;;c".'ibuti::rn for value of a controlled substance. 't'he Defendar.: 
hac! 2r;i:.ea] ed his conviction 0n grounds that, amor·g other thing<, 
t ;,., Pro<i8CUt ion had made oblique but imperrni ssible references tc 
t11.': failure of the Defendant to testify in his own behalf. Th 0 
Accepting the proposition that the remarks 
complained of were improper, the question of 
more orave concern is whether, in the light 
of th~ total picture as presented in this case, 
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that impropriety should be regarded as pre-
judicial error and justify reversal of the 
conviction. We note our awareness that there 
should be no such reversal merely to criticise 
a Prosecutor who, perhaps in the ardor of 
advocacy in the trial, oversteps the bounds of 
propriety, nor merely because error has been 
committed. 
Consistant with the nature of criminal 
proceedings and the protections accorded those 
accussed of crime under our law, including the 
presumption of innocence and the burden of the 
State to prove the Defendant's guilt bevond a 
reasonable doubt, we believe that, on appeal, 
when there is reasonable doubt as to whether the 
error below was preiudicial, that doubt should be 
resolved in favor of the Defendant. (Emphasis added) 
569 P.2d at 116. 
Because the error was sufficient to justify the reasonable 
belief that it had a substantial effect adverse to the Def-
endant's right to a fair trial, the error was not regarded as 
harmless. So too, in the instant case, there is a reasonable 
likelihood that in the absence of the prejudicial statements by 
the trial judge and the Prosecutor the jury would not have been 
able to come to a verdict of guilty. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the facts in this case lend themselves just as 
easily to a conclusion that the Complaining witness consented 
ro sexual intercourse as they do to the conclusion that she did 
not consent, the improper statements made by the trial court and 
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the Prosecutor must be presumed prejudicial. The facts as 
established at trial are simply insufficient by themselves to 
support a conviction of the Defendant for rape and forcible 
sodomy. Therefore the errors at trial should be found by this 
court to be grounds for reversal of the Defendant's conviction. 
both counts, and the case remanded for a new trial. 
;!-
RESPECTIVELY SUBMITTED this ~ day of /M/ay,/l/. 
I / 
/ ,./ 
,. / 
/ ,;_--r,'-";_"_· -~~· ---------------'=--
,/,GARY ~/. ANDERSON 
Att_g.rney for Appellant 
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I hereGy certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant to the Utah Attorney General, DAVID WILKINSON, 
dt "36 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this _.Jj;}_ day 
of Hay, 1981. 
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